F-35: Obvious answers to critical questions

One of the more persistant criticisms of the F-35 can be found in these arguments:

But low observability comes at a cost in speed, endurance and weapons load. Some critics say the F-35’s performance will lag existing aircraft, and that its range and payload are too small. 

The answer, for those who think about it, should be pretty obvious as well:

But Lockheed counters the F-35 can carry 18,500 pounds of fuel — far more than the CF-18, for example — and Flynn has said publicly it will outperform fourth-generation jets with a combat payload.

 Plus, Scott adds, it’s versatile: When you need stealth, say, to “kick in the door” and take out enemy air defences, the F-35A can carry 2,400 kg of missiles and bombs internally. When you don’t need stealth, that jumps to 8,000 kg — “as good or better” than “legacy” jets or competitors — by adding six hardpoints under the wings, two of which can take 600-gallon drop tanks. 

One of the apples and oranges performance comparisons we're constantly given is that of a slick 4th gen fighter compared to a combat loaded F-35.  Or a non-combat configured fighter vs. a combat configured fighter.  When the 4th generation fighter is combat configured, suddenly those performance numbers change pretty radically and we see the F-35's performance numbers shine in comparison.  When everything that is necessary to go into combat is hanging on the 4th gen fighter's wings, suddenly it isn't as fast or maneuverable as without those assets.  The F-35, when combat configured, remains "slick" with nothing hanging from it's wings.

Additionally, what is usually left out of the argument is what the external loading vs. internal loading does to the radar signature.  For a 4th generation fighter it simply makes the fighter even more visible.  The F-35, however, maintains the same low visibility because of its internal loading.

The point, of course, is it really doesn't matter how much ordnance a 4th gen aircraft can carry if it can't successfully penetrate denied airspace and complete the mission while the F-35 can.    And, as mentioned, if low observability isn't a requirement, if we have air dominance for instance, then the addition of hardpoints to the wings of the F-35 make it able to carry as much if not more ordnance into combat than can a 4th generation fighter.

Points to ponder and remember the next time you hear these same old arguments trotted out as a critique of the F-35.

Graff

F-35: The superiority of the F-35's low observability capability

Read an interesting article by a Canadian journalist who went to Ft. Worth to see the F-35 being built and filed a story.  Part of the story includes these paragraphs which help make an important point:

Radar works by bouncing radio waves off targets, like aircraft, which are picked up by a receiver. Stealth technology doesn’t make F-35 invisible to radar, but rather redirects, absorbs or weakens the radar signal to make it harder to “see.”

That’s a “quantum leap” in air combat, says Flynn. “It’s not invisibility, it’s very low observability to the point you can almost act with impunity.” That, he says, will let the F-35 go where existing warplanes increasingly can’t: close enough to destroy air or ground targets defended by state-of-the-art anti-aircraft systems.

The F-35 has gained from Lockheed Martin’s stealth experience: They built the first operational stealth fighter, the F-117 Nighthawk, an aerodynamically unlikely, diamond-faceted flying flatiron that gave Saddam Hussein’s gunners fits in Iraq.

They also built the F-22 Raptor, America’s state-of-the-art fifth-generation air-dominance fighter. “That’s what we use as our stepping stone with the F-35,” says Flynn, who has piloted most fourth-generation fighters and test-flown Eurofighter Typhoon. “That’s our confidence.” “You can’t just apply a coating,” or tweak a few features of an older aircraft to make it stealthy, Scott stresses, perhaps referring to Boeing’s proposals for stealthy versions of its competing F-18 Super Hornet and older F-15 Eagle. “It’s . . . fundamental to the design.” 

This is a part of the F-35 story that often gets short shrift.  The low observability it enjoys is a result of 2 previous generations of stealth technology.  And, as the article points out, you can't just make a non-stealthy jet stealthy.  It's more than a coating.  It is fundamental to the design.   Unless the aircraft is designed to maximize low observability, there's not much a coating can do.  So "stealthy versions" of non-stealthy aircraft, unless that includes a major redesign of the airframe to maximize the low observability in the redesign, is just putting lipstick on a pig.  It may be "more stealthy" than it's unstealthy counterpart, but it is nowhere near as stealthy as the F-35.  Hanging stealthy pods on a non-stealthy aircraft doesn't make it comparable to the F-35. 

Another point to be made here is because the F-35 is a 3rd generation low observable aircraft, it's competition from Russia and China will likely suffer by comparison.  Each of those nations is developing it's first generation stealth aircraft, so we're likely to see much more sophisticated and effective low observability with the F-35 than with the Russian or Chinese 5th generation fighters.

Graff

F-35: VMFAT-501 launches 8 F-35s, does 16 sorties in 3 hours

Lt. Col David Berke, commander of VMFAT-501 at Eglin AB in Florida, recently announced:

Today (April 26, 2013), VMFAT-501 executed an 8 ship launch for Air to Air and Air to Ground training, completed hot refueling on all eight jets and launched them on a second mission.

That's big news.  One of the early but unsubstantiated criticisms of the F-35  was it wouldn't be reliable enough to have a high sortie rate.  8 for 8 is pretty reliable in anyone's book.  In fact, the criticisms we're seeing remind one of the same sorts of criticisms (ironically from many of the same critics) we saw concerning the Apache helicopter prior to Desert Storm (or the M1 Abrams MBT for that matter).  We then saw how well it performed, actually firing the opening shots in that battle.

A reminder - hot refueling is done at the completion of a mission with the pilot still in the aircraft (rearming would also take place during that period).  It is a method the Marine Corps uses to increase the sortie rate for it's aircraft.  The F-35s apparently performed well.

Col Arthur Tomassetti, Vice Commander of the 33rd Fighter Wing at Eglin said of the event:

The ability for VMFAT-501 to launch and recover 8 jets at the same time shows the increasing capability of the training center at Eglin and the continuing maturity of the F-35 program. 

Indeed it does.

Graff

More F-35Bs headed to MCAS Yuma

The first operational F-35 squadron in the world will be receiving more aircraft in the coming months:

Marine Corps Air Station Yuma's F-35 program seems to be moving forward after a brief stall.

A spokesperson with Lockheed Martin, the Texas based manufacturer of the fighter jet, says the company is scheduled to deliver at least one F-35 a month to MCAS Yuma for the rest of the year. Shipping had stalled due to a government issued precautionary suspension.

MCAS Yuma is home to the world's first operational F-35 squadron and currently houses four F-35's. 

Just a small note on a local media outlet that won't likely get much play but indicates that the program continues to go forward.  MCAS Yuma will be receiving, as noted, an F-35B a month for the rest of the year.

Graff

Israel names it's F-35's

Again I want to emphasize that Israel isn't a country to take on a new weapon's system lightly.  It makes a very detailed analysis of what is available and is very careful about it's choices.  For the country, one loss on the battlefield means the end of their nation.  They're unlikely to put their future on a aircraft they have doubts about.

The name chosen is a bit unusual, given their past naming conventions, but I think it pretty much sums up their belief in what the F-35 brings to the IAF:

On Wednesday, the Israeli Air Force christened the plane Adir, which in modern Hebrew denotes awesomeness, radness and all-around cool (the dictionary definition is a bit more sober).

While Israel’s first F-35 squadron is slated to arrive in 2017, the army has started to prepare for it — readying structures and runways, and training technical crews and pilots — and thus needed to give it a Hebrew moniker.

 The name was chosen from among more than 1,700 suggestions handed in by IAF soldiers and people from the defense industry. Naming the jet Adir reflects its capabilities and emphasizes the upgrade it will provide to the air force’s capabilities, the IAF said in a statement. 

You might say that a name doesn't really denote much of anything and go on to point to weapons systems that never lived up to theirs.  But in the context of the first paragraph, I don't think this name for this aircraft, given who is bestowing it, points to a fighter that won't live up to it's name.

Graff

Chairman of the JCS gets behind the F-35

General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, swung his weight behind the F-35 recently in a session with the Senate's Armed Services Committee:

A self-described "ground-pounder" (soldier), Dempsey told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that he was "open-minded" on the fate of the F-35 until he talked to a Marine officer running one of the first operational squadrons of F-35s at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. Dempsey said that conversation about the plane's performance turned him into an advocate. And then he put his finger on what may be the most important reason for buying the F-35: "We haven't been attacked from the air since April 15, 1953, and I'm not going to be the chairman on whose watch... that's reversed." 

A lot of the critics seem to not understand the importance of that point, especially to America's military.   It is more than a point of pride.  It is a point of critical importance.  What it points to is a military that has been able to establish air dominance and maintain it to the point that enemy aircraft have found it impossible to penetrate our air umbrella and attack our troops on the ground.

That is absolutely critical to victory.  And in modern warfare, the side which is able to do this rarely loses.

Gen. Dempsey understands that point from a very personal perspective.  He's also now convinced that the F-35 is the aircraft of the future that will ensure that record stays intact.

Graff

F-35: Will it cost 10% more to operate than an F-16?

The preliminary answer, i.e. the answer using today's figures and for the time being, seems to be "yes".

The single-engine F-35A is expected to cost about 10 percent more to operate than the F-16 it is intended to replace for the U.S. Air Force and other international military services, according to U.S. government officials. USAF

Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, program executive officer overseeing the F-35 program, told Dutch lawmakers that the cost-per-flying-hour for the F-35A, which The Netherlands intends to buy, is $24,000, according to an Air Force spokeswoman.

So at this moment, we're looking at about $2,400 dollars an hour more.

Will that change?  Well yes, most likely.  And likely for the better.  For instance, we know that we are likely to have a new engine on the horizon for the F-35:

AFRL calculates adaptive technology will improve engine fuel efficiency by 25% over the F135 powering the F-35, increasing aircraft combat radius by 25-30% and persistence by 30-40%.

Obviously, that might save that 10%.  Then there's also this point to be considered:

Company officials had argued the cost of some subsystems, such as the electro-optical target system, or information technology systems used to support the aircraft, should not be included in the F-35 lifecycle estimate because they are not calculated in the price of operating legacy aircraft. 

Of course there are those who would argue that it should be calculated because it is indeed a part of the cost.  True.  But it is also a capability that doesn't exist on the F-16.  So is the addition of that capability worth "10%"?  My guess is it is worth much more.  If it provides an aircraft able to penetrate contested airspace an F-16 can't, then its worth may be incalculable.

Finally,  remember, this establishes a baseline number while the aircraft is still in development and testing.  It gives the manufacturer a target to achieve through efficiencies, etc.  10% isn't a very high percentage at this point when kept in context and compared to the capabilities the aircraft promises.

Be sure to watch how the critics handle the number.

Graff

F-35: Critics pontificate without enough information

I wanted to point you to another great post on "Elements of Power" where SMSgtMac again takes the critics to task, to wit:

I can’t remember when I saw so many media outlets, bloggers, and just general ‘people’ with their panties in a wad over something they didn’t really understand. Honestly, who among those ‘critics’ bemoaning the Sustained G turn requirement changing from 5.3 to 4.6Gs even know everything they need to know as ‘inputs’ before they could even begin to formulate an informed opinion on the topic? There is STILL insufficient information in the public domain to come to any conclusions, but there’s a heck of a lot of presumption and assumption in spite of it. 

The point of course, and this has been a pretty consistent failing on the part of many critics of this program, is they simply don't know what they're talking about when they criticize many times.  And others, it is apparent that they simply don't understand the concept they're trying to criticize.  Yet they still get press.

Some things will never change I suppose.  Meanwhile, take a look at the cited post.  Very technical, very thorough, but in the end you can't help but conclude that at this point, the critics are just criticizing to criticize without understanding what they're criticizing.

If that makes your head feel like it wants to explode, welcome to the club.

Graff

Navy lines up behind the F-35

You've heard the old saying "attitude is everything?"  Well, it may not be "everything" but it is vitally important, many times making the difference between success and failure.  Part of a winning attitude is overcoming obstacles and gaining success.

No one denies the F-35 program has faced it's share of obstacles, but as the USMC Commandant said, every new aircraft suffers teething problems.   The F-35 program has progressed well the last two years and now enters it's most important phase of testing. While it obviously "has to work",  a winning attitude sure doesn't hurt.

We've all read any number of articles that have intimated that the Navy isn't behind the program.  Well, if that was true, I don't think it is true anymore.  That is, if you believe the deputy program director for that service:

Rear Adm. Randolph L. Mahr, deputy program executive officer for the F-35, said “ We’re not going to focus on the past. What’s past is done. In 2001, the United States government made a choice on which aircraft to develop and we’re going to bring it across the finish line,” Mahr said.

The Marine Corps will receive an operational aircraft in summer of 2015, Mahr said. “Put it on your calendars,” he said.

“The United States Marine Corps is holding us to that date. The United States Air Force is right behind them. Our partner nations are right behind them.”That's the sort of attitude that will put the aircraft in the field on time.  And Mahr isn't the only Navy officer saying that sort of thing:

He's not the only officer saying those sorts of things. Recently the CNO said the Navy was "all in" for the F-35. And the commander of Naval Air Systems Command had this to say:

“We are now in the meat of this program,” said Vice Adm. David Dunaway, commander of Naval Air Systems Command, said April 10 at the Navy League’s annual Sea Air Space symposium at National Harbor, Md. “We’ve come a long way to get here. We’re now to the part that is really important. This is where the rubber is going to meet the road and we’re going to succeed or we’re going to fail.” 

And, unspoken but true, failure is not an option.

Graff

F-35: Israel's "pack of leopards"

If you can beat your way through all the negativity the author of this article tries to lay on the F-35, you'll see that Israel is a country that "gets it" when it comes to the JSF and it's capabilities:

The Jerusalem Post reports that the technological revolution is based on creating a "digital network in the skies" that integrates strike jets, electronic warfare aircraft, in-flight refueling tankers and helicopters into a multitude of real-time data sources that include ground forces, the navy and the intelligence services.

It's called network-centric warfare, and the program's run by the air force's Information Communication Technology branch.

This will give combat pilots an unprecedented view of the battlespace and allow their controllers to direct a variety of combat platforms to the most important strategic and tactical targets.

"We can communicate directly with other platforms," a senior air force officer told the Post. "This acts as a force multiplier...

"It's like a pack of leopards on a hunt. They work together in a network, not as individuals."

The source noted that this move toward wiring the air force into a single digital network was a primary reason for selecting the F-35. The Israeli version is known as the F-35I.

"The F-35I was chosen not because it was the fastest, or because it can carry the most munitions, but because of its network capabilities," the senior officer explained. "All of the information is available to it. It knows what threatens it, its situation at any given moment, and the status of fellow aircraft. It's a network entity."

Those capabilities make it more than an evolution in fighter aircraft.  The F-35 is a revolutionary aircraft.

The quote above, as acknowledged by the author of the article, comes from the Jerusalem Post.  The negativity it is wrapped in is all the authors.  How clueless is this person?  This should help you make that determination:

The aircraft, for now the world's only fifth-generation fighter, is intended to ensure Israel's military supremacy in the Middle East, underwritten by the United States, through the first quarter of the century.

Really?  I'm sure that will come as a complete surprise to F-22 pilots as well as the Chinese and Russians.  He or she goes on to compound their problem by quoting well known anti-JSF windbag Winslow Wheeler.

The point for this post, however, is to give you an idea of why the Israeli's are so high on the F-35.  Unlike most of the critics, they "get it" and they don't talk in 4th generation terms about "dogfights" and other capabilities of that era which will be less and less important in the 5th generation.  They understand what the F-35's capabilities mean.   They see the vast potential this will bring to the skies over Israel and how it will give them the ability to get inside the enemy's decision cycle, see them first and shoot them first.

The network, the sensor fusion, the low observability all will combine to give them one of the most capable fighters in the world as well as one of the most deadly air forces in the world.

A pack of hunting leopards.

Graff

F-35: Tailhook assembly re-design ready for testing

As we're reported here, the tailhook problem appears to have been solved and the entire tailhook assembly is being readied for testing.  The latest news:

“Our original design was not performing as expected,” said Lorraine Martin, Lockheed Martin’s executive vice president for the F35 Lightning II program. Martin said the “toe” of the tailhook, the part that grabs the wire, had been re-designed along with the “hold down damper” gear that forces the tailhook down on the deck.

“It’s now in line with what the legacy aircraft uses,” Martin said of the new F-35 tailhook. She said the new assembly will be tested this summer at the Navy’s Lakehurst, N.J., facility and carrier tests were expected later this year.

 [Head of the Naval Air Systems Command,Vice Adm. David]Dunaway said he believed Lockheed Martin had found the right tailhook fix before he back pedaled and said: “I will be a trust but verify person.” Rear Adm. Randollph Mahr, the deputy Program Executive Officer for the F-35, said “I have high confidence that that tailhook will be catching wires at Lakehurst.” 

The new tailhook design has been in testing for a while.  The other part of the system that was causing problems was the "hold down damper".  They were getting a bounce and a skip when the hook hit causing it to miss wires.  With the redesign of the hook complete as well as the redesigned hold down damper, the entire assembly will now go through testing at Lakehurst.

Another teething problem apparently solved, assuming the testing goes well and, continuing with that assumption, air to ship integration isn't that far off at all.

Graff

F-35 emerges as a "winner" in the latest budget announcements

That is, at least, according to Politico's "Morning Defense" which said this yesterday while speaking of Lockheed Martin in general:

The company's flagship F-35 Lightning II was a clear early winner in the administration's spending plan, which requests 29 aircraft and does not resort to the postponements or "probation" the Pentagon has previously tried with the controversial program. 

That's good news for the program because it keeps production moving, will build on the efficiencies it has already amassed and, as it continues, mean less costly aircraft.

Of course, the program isn't 'controversial' to the warfighters who will benefit from it's advanced capabilities.  It is only 'controversial' to the media, which should come as no real surprise.  The reason the Pentagon didn't "resort" to "postponements or 'probation'" was because there is no reason to do so.

Graff

 

F-35: CNO and USMC Commandant express support for F-35 but say procurement system is broken

I don't think this comes as a surprise to anyone:

The top officers in the Navy and Marine Corps defended their most expensive program, Lockheed Martin's troubled F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, while acknowledging the way the Pentagon buys such weapons is not merely broken but "constipated."

General Amos said of the F-35B:

"There's no alternative for the United States Marine Corps to the F-35B," Commandant Gen. James Amos said at the opening session of the Navy League's annual Sea-Air-Space conference. "I want to make that crystal clear to everybody in the audience." All the great aircraft of the past have gone through teething troubles in development, said Amos, a pilot himself. 

His last statement seems to be lost on certain critics who almost seem to be gleeful anytime the program encounters problems.

Adm. Greenert said:

"Speaking for the Navy," added the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, "I need the fifth-generation fighter, and that [F-35] provides it, so we're all in -- but it has to perform. It has problems; it is making progress." 

The article goes on to say Greenert has "damned" the JSF in the past with "faint praise". I'm not sure what passes for solid praise in the author's world, but "we're all in" does so in most other people's. And the caveat "it has to perform" is an obvious one which clearly is true. All indications are the F-35 will do just fine.

The procurement process, however, is another matter.  Here in a nutshell is a description of the problem:

After years of acquisition "reforms" that have empowered the civilian Department of Defense bureaucracy at the expense of the uniformed services, "the service chiefs need to get back in," said Amos. "Congress doesn't give the program manager a dime, they give the service chiefs the money... It's our money, these are our programs."

Agreed Greenert, "I as a service chief would like to have more authority and more accountability in acquisitions." There are far too many different bureaucratic entities with input into the "requirements" for new systems, but none of them is held accountable for the delay and expense produced by the waffling back and forth over an ever-longer wish list. The buck should stop with service chiefs like himself and Amos, Greenert argued -- which may well require Congress to reexamine the landmark 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act "and consider altering it."

Give the responsibility and accountability to the service chiefs and let them handle the programs.  That would eliminate the ability of "different bureaucratic entities" from inserting requirements into the system that the services don't want and aren't demanding.  That would also help cut the time necessary to field new weapons.

Graff

South Korea indicates it is down to two fighters, F-35 included

Yet another Asian ally is showing indications that its choice for its future fighter might be the F-35:

The US Department of Defense formally notified the US Congress of potential sales of the Boeing F-15SE Silent Eagle and Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to South Korea on 29 March. The two aircraft are on offer to the Asian nation as part of South Korea's F-X III fighter competition. The Eurofighter Typhoon is a third contender for the 60 aircraft tender.

For the potential F-35 sale, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) says that South Korea could order 60 conventional A-model aircraft and associated support equipment for $10.8 billion. There would also be provisions for spares including nine additional Pratt & Whitney F135 afterburning turbofans. The package would also encompass training-including simulators.

If I had to guess, and that's all this is, I could see South Korea opting for both.  The F-15SE would fulfill it's near future needs, give it a 4th generation plus capability and allow it to begin it's phase out of older fighters.  It might also buy some F-35s which would then give them 5th generation capabilities that go far beyond the F-15SE's and would allow much better joint interoperability among their allies.

To be on the safe side the Flight Global argument includes this caveat:

Lockheed Martin says that it is pleased that the formal Congressional notification process is now under way, but notes that the competing bids are still being evaluated by Korea and price discussions are "on-going".

That said:

While he does not rule out the possibility that South Korea will opt for the Typhoon, Raymond Jaworowski, an analyst with Forecast International, says the contest will most like come down to a battle between the F-35 and the Silent Eagle. "The F-15 and the F-35 are the frontrunners," he says. "South Korea has previously bought US fighter aircraft and it seems likely that's the way they'll go for this buy."

In the Silent Eagle's favour is the fact that South Korea already has the older F-15K Slam Eagle in service. "The commonality factor will come into play," Jaworowski says. "On the other hand, the F-35 is more and more becoming the dominant fighter on the market."

Other factors that play in the F-35's favour are the fact that Japan has already ordered the stealthy fifth-generation jet and growing threats in the region. But given the state of the South Korean tender, "I think at this point it's too early to predict between the F-35 and the F-15," Jaworowski says.

As we've seen with Singapore and Japan, the F-35 ended up being the aircraft of choice.  Don't rule out a mix which includes some F-15SE's but look for the F-35 to go to South Korea in the end.

Graff

Video: F-35B - first night vertical landing

If this doesn't get you fired up, you're dead:

Graff

F-35: The metrics have changed? Sorry, but that's not a bad thing

Over the past few weeks, you've seen various critics get the vapors as they attempt to claim that the changes made in the metrics for the F-35 point to a failing aircraft and a failing program.

Not really.  In fact, not really at all.  But you have to know something about how aircraft (or any other program for that matter) are developed to understand that.   Someone who does, SMSgt Mac over at "Elements of Power", shines some welcome light on the subject.  It is a very technical discussion, however, he sets it up with this perspective:

1. Performance metrics are used as PROXIES for what is important in a Weapon System under acquisition or already fielded. The metrics are NOT important in and of themselves. They are only as important as the degree to which they inform developers and operators on the system’s true versus desired capabilities.

and...

2. Weapon system specifications are initially established based upon what is believed to be needed and what is believed to be feasible within the projected budget and schedule before the development is given the ‘go-ahead’. There are only varying degrees of assumed confidence in the ability to achieve what is seen as feasible, and this depends much on perceived technology maturity. Only after the project is underway will the need and/or feasibility, given the actual maturity and budget, begin to be revealed, and it may be only truly knowable towards the end of development. Adjusting the specifications as new information is acquired, while still meeting Warfighter needs is sound engineering and management. It is NOT (as someone in the POGO crowd or ‘low information media’ might claim) “cheating” or a sign of “failure”. 

With that in mind, go read the whole thing.  It does a great job of explaining why what SMSgt Mac calls the low information media, are in a low hover over the information.  They don't know any better and make no attempt to find out.  And, they're gassed up by the usual suspects among the critics who know about as much as the media they feed.

Of course, in terms of perspective or accuracy and this program, the critics and media have never tried very hard to provide it.

Graff

F-35 called "best choice" by Chief of Japanese Defense Forces

Again I want to point out something that flies in the face of what some critics claim would be sufficient for our future - 4th generation plus aircraft.  Why is it that nations whose future may depend on their aircraft choice of the future - such as Israel, Singapore and Japan - have chosen the F-35?  

Japan's highest-ranking uniformed officer said on Wednesday that Lockheed Martin's F-35 fighters were the best choice for the nation's future operational needs as Tokyo wrestles with tensions with China and increasingly belligerent North Korea.

The vote of confidence in the state-of-the-art U.S. warplane comes amid reports that some nations that have placed orders for the F-35s are reconsidering their plans.

Shigeru Iwasaki, chief of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces' Joint Staff, also said advancement of North Korea's arms technology in a series of nuclear and missile tests posed a serious threat to Japan, but its missile defense system should provide the country with sufficient protection.

"When I was the head of the air force, I spearheaded the decision (to procure F-35s). Or, rather, we drew up a plan, which was then approved by defense minister," said Iwasaki, a veteran fighter pilot who used to fly F-15s, Japan's current mainstay combat aeroplane. "There were various candidates. But I still believe the F-35 is the best fighter, when we think about Japan's future national security," he said in an interview with Reuters.

So evaluating the "various candidates", Japan's highest ranking officer and former F-15 pilot finds the F-35 the fighter of choice.

Again,  putting this in the context of my question above, why, if what the critics claim is true, wouldn't these nations opt for the critic's choice?

I pointed out one reason on Monday.  The other reason is they seem to "get it" when it comes to what the advanced capabilities the F-35 will bring to their defense forces and how those capabilities will be a game changer.

The critics?  Not so much.

Graff

F-35: Manufacturing costs dropping, efficiencies increasing

Another part of the GAO report that I wanted to highlight isn't very sexy, in terms of discussions of fighter jets, but it is very important because of the criticism the F-35 program routinely incurs when it comes to discussions of cost.   One of the points made repeatedly by the manufacturer is as the program matures and as the learning curve became less steep, we'll see efficiencies develop that would help bring down those costs.  That's exactly what the GAO found: 

Manufacturing Is Becoming More Efficient: Analyses of labor, parts, and quality data, observations on the manufacturing floor, and discussions with defense and contracting officials provide signs that F-35 manufacturing and supply processes are improving. The aircraft contractor is moving down a steep learning curve, which is a measure that the work force is gaining important experience and that processes are maturing as more aircraft are built. Other indicators of improvement include the following:

* The decrease in labor hours needed to complete aircraft at the prime contractor's plant as the labor force gains experience. For example, the first Air Force production jet was delivered in May 2011 and required about 149,000 labor hours at the prime's plant to build, while an Air Force jet delivered in December 2012 only required about 94,000 labor hours. Overall, the contractor reported a 37 percent reduction in direct labor during 2012.

* The improvement in the contractor's labor efficiency rate, a measure of how long it is taking to complete certain work tasks against engineering standards. Labor efficiency on the first production aircraft was 6 percent and improved to 13 percent for the 31st production aircraft. While still low, Defense Contract Management Agency officials stated that the rate should continue to improve with increased production due to work force learning and factory line enhancements. * The decrease in span times--the number of calendar days to manufacture aircraft in total and in specific work staging areas. The aircraft contractor is altering assembly line processes to streamline factory flow. As a result, for example, span time in the final assembly area declined by about one-third in 2012 compared to 2011.

* The increase in factory throughput as the contractor delivered 30 production aircraft in 2012 compared to 9 in 2011. During our plant visit in 2012, we observed an increased level of activity on the manufacturing floor as compared to 2011. The contractor had more tooling in place, had altered and streamlined processes, and had factory expansion plans underway. * The decrease in traveled work (work done out of sequence or incomplete items moving to the next work station), parts shortages on the line, and product defects. For example, traveled work declined 90 percent and the defect rate declined almost 80 percent in 2012 compared to 2011. Other quality indicators such as scrap rates and non- conformances also improved from prior years and are trending in a positive direction. These have all been major contributors to past cost increases and schedule delays. * The accomplishment of a schedule risk analysis to improve the contractor's master schedule and related schedules. A schedule risk analysis is a comprehensive evaluation that uses statistical techniques to examine the fidelity of schedule estimates and the likelihood of accomplishing work as scheduled. It provides better and timelier insight into program performance to help identify and resolve schedule roadblocks.

 * The improvement in aircraft contractor manufacturing processes, although not fully mature compared to best practice standards. The aircraft contractor is using statistical process control to bring critical manufacturing processes under control so they are repeatable, sustainable, and consistently producing parts within quality tolerances and standards. The best practice standard is to have all critical manufacturing processes in control by the start of production. Just over one-third of manufacturing processes are currently judged to be capable of consistently producing quality parts at the best practice standard. The contractor has a plan in place to achieve the best practice standard by the start of full-rate production in 2019. We have observed this quality practice on only a few DOD programs.

So as the program and production matures, we should continue to see increased efficiencies and decreased costs.  Just as promised.  Caveat: that assumes that the total buy promised is fulfilled.  Otherwise, we'll end up with much more expensive aircraft just like we did with the F-22 and B-2 and we'll be well short of the capability we need for the future.

Graff

F-35: Reality drives Pacific allies to F-35

That reality is posed in a quote at an Australian news site:

China is also flight testing two stealth fighters, the J-20 and the J-31, although they are not expected to enter service until the end of the decade at the earliest, military aviation experts said.

"It's an open question as to how advanced and sophisticated they actually are," said Andrew Davies, a senior strategy analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, referring to the Chinese fighters.

"But having said that, they make life more difficult for existing types, so the F-35 becomes more important." 

It is indeed "an open question" as to how advanced and sophisticated the Chinese 5th generation stealth aircraft are, but the bottom line is they not only exist, but are being developed for production.  Keep in mind this is China's first generation of stealth aircraft while the US is working on it's 3rd generation.

However the old military dictum comes to mind - one should always prepare for the worst case scenario.  In this case, the worst case scenario is China successfully develops sophisticated and advanced stealthy aircraft. 

Obviously, then, as Davies points out, "the F-35 becomes more important" than it was previously because of what our allied nations could conceivably face.

What should be just as obvious, but apparently isn't, is the F-35 is an aircraft designed with advanced capabilities in both the tactical and strategic sense.  It is designed to be extremely capable in a scenario that would include Chinese 5th gen fighters (i.e. "worst case") and to give us a clear advantage if facing 4th generation opposition.

Our Pacific allies and potential allies seem to hae figured this out.  Japan has committed to the F-35 as has Singapore and Australia.  South Korea, especially given what is going on now, will likely do so too.  They see the handwriting on the wall and realized the best option to counter the worst-case threat is the F-35.

Perhaps some day the critics here at home will come to that realization as well.

Graff 

F-35B performing an AIM 120 Weapon Separation

Another milestone accomplishment.  This time the "B" or STVOL variation:

Graff

F-35: UK announces basing plans for F-35

And the F-35 program marches on:

The UK's Lightning II stealth fighter aircraft will be based at RAF Marham in Norfolk, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond announced today.

Speaking at Marham, Defense Secretary Hammond said:

Speaking from RAF Marham, Mr Hammond said: This is the next step in the restructuring of the Armed Forces, providing them with the world’s most capable combat aircraft. Basing the new Lightning II at RAF Marham makes strategic sense and best use of the resources available. It also secures the future of one of the UK’s most operationally-experienced bases.

The Lightning II is the most advanced jet our Armed Forces have ever operated, and carries on the tradition of the Harrier, while having far greater range, payload and defensive capability. Now this decision has been taken, we can start the planning and infrastructure investment required for RAF Marham’s future. 

The plan?

The UK’s first 2 Lightning II aircraft are currently participating in the US test programme and will remain in the US. We expect to receive front line aircraft from 2015 onwards with an initial operating capability from land in 2018, followed by first of class flights from HMS Queen Elizabeth later that year. 

I bring these sorts of stories to your attention because they get little play in the defense media and none among the critics of the program.  They're important milestones in the development and deployment of the world's most advanced 5th generation fighter.

What this story tells you is the UK is now fully committed to the F-35. This decision is based on their Strategic Defense and Security Review done in 2010.  What will happen now, just as it did in Yuma, AZ before the USMC stood up its first operational F-35 squadron, is the building and installing of the infrastructure necessary to support F-35s.

Critics would like you to believe the F-35's future is tenuous at best.  Stories like this and the one about the USAF beginning its OT&E argue in very concrete terms that the opposite is really the truth.

Graff

F-35: Wheeler's blustery baseless blast

Sometimes Washington DC's most abundant product is hot air.  In fact, a lot of hot air.  And much of it comes from those whose entire job and background seem to be focused on producing it and not much more.

One such individual is so-called defense critic Winslow Wheeler.  Wheeler's modus operandi can be summarized in one sentence: "If DoD is for it, he's against it".  He couches his criticism in a claimed expertise he doesn't have and does it all in the name of outing wasteful spending.  He further advances the notion that he knows what's best for our nation's security and the "milicrats" - his term - are letting the nation down.

He popped up again this week like a hot air balloon in order to take his usual pot shots at the F-35 program.  Part of his criticism is based on a report we mentioned earlier about pilots who complained about the cockpit visibility on the F-35 and the claim that the hampered visibility would get them "gunned down" every time.

We also pointed out that LTG Bogdan, who heads the program for DoD, reportedly said that any F-35 pilot with that concern could find a new job flying C-12s.  Bogden pointed out that the F-35 has the DAS which gives the pilot unprecedented 360 visibility and essentially makes the headrest complained about invisible.

Well that set Wheeler off.  As is usual in his screeds, you only get part of the story (DAS is never mentioned by Wheeler) which led to this bit of nonsense:

Sure, general, that's just what DOD needs more of: Washington-based bureaucrats talking down to servicemen in the field with the character to express their experience-based concerns about defective equipment. Donald Rumsfeld did the same thing in 2004 when a reservist in Iraq had the gall to suggest that soldiers should not have to scrounge in scrap heaps to improvise "hillbilly armor" to survive in their vehicles in combat. Saying, "You go to war with the Army you have," Rumsfeld told the soldier to suck it up.

Lt. Gen. Bogdan, welcome to your own personal alcove in Donald Rumsfeld's hall of conceit. 

So one of the most advanced pieces of military equipment is the equivalent to "hillbilly armor"? Oh, wait, that's right, Wheeler never mentioned it did he?

By the way, in case you've wondered about "milicrat" LTG Bogdan's qualifications to run the F-35 program, take a peek at his resume.    Then read Wheeler's.  No contest.  The only thing Wheeler has "test piloted" is a pen.

After chastising Bogdan, Wheeler launches attacks against all others who've had the temerity to support the program and report it to be making progress.  If you can't argue against the message, try to smear the messenger.  And, unsurprisingly, that's precisely where Wheeler heads.  His targets are varied but he spends most of his time attempting to smear the GAO so he can claim it's report should be discounted.

In a lengthy and wordy attack, this is the sum of his ramblings:

In short, DOD appears to have an unseen hand in influencing the text of GAO reports, and the management guidance as perceived by the GAO staff is to accept the DOD guidance to reduce as much as possible any areas of disagreement. The differences may only be subtle in a final GAO report, or they could appear in the form of strangely unsubstantiated assertions and conclusions -- the sort of vapid statements that appear in GAO's new F-35 report. 

In short, he has nothing but the usual innuendo, baseless assumptions, bluster and half-truths. The stock and trade of a man well out of his depths.

Graff

F-35: Air Force to begin Operational Testing and Evaluation

A little blurb in AINOnline caught my attention:

Operational testing and evaluation of the F-35A has begun, with the delivery of four aircraft to Nellis AFB. They were accepted by the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center in a ceremony on March 19. Eight more F-35As will join them by 2019. 

This isn't about Lockheed Martin testing the aircraft.  OT&E begins the Air Force's evaluation of the aircraft.  OT&E is the formal testing conducted prior to deployment of an aircraft (or any other major piece of equipment) to evaluate the operational effectiveness and suitability of the system with respect to its mission.

Or to be more succinct, the program continues to make progress.

Graff

F-35: GAO and the helmet mounted display

Those that have followed the development issues with the F-35 also know the helmet mounted display for the F-35 is critical to accessing and using the advanced capabilities of the aircraft.  They also know there have been some issues with the helmet mounted display, serious enough that the contractor agreed to pursing the development of a less capable helmet at the same time in case the primary helmet's problems couldn't be fixed.

The GAO doesn't spend a great deal of time on the helmet mounted display, but does say this:

The helmet mounted display (which provides flight data, targeting, and other sensor data to the pilot) is integral to the mission systems architecture, to reduce pilot workload, and to achieve the F-35’s concept of operations. The original helmet mounted display encountered significant technical deficiencies and did not meet warfighter requirements. The program is pursuing a dual path by developing a second, less capable helmet while working to fix the first helmet design. Both helmets are being evaluated and program and contractor officials told us that they have increased confidence that the helmet deficiencies will be fixed. DOD may make a decision as to which helmet to procure in 2013, but the selected helmet is not expected to be integrated into the baseline aircraft until 2015.

However, if you've been following the development of the primary helmet, you know that great progress has been made addressing the problems it has had, namely jitter, latency and night vision acuity.

Lockheed Martin, in a March 14th update, said the following:

Pilots have flown more than 4,000 flights and 5,000 hours with the helmet and our feedback from pilots at Edwards, PAX River, Eglin and Ft. Worth, is they love this helmet. During the fall, dedicated tests were performed testing the improvements we’ve made and the results are positive.

There have been reports that both the jitter and latency problems have been successfully addressed and the night vision problem is nearing resolution.  Reading between the lines of the LM release, it appears the company is pretty confident that the primary helmet will be the choice and that at this time, at least, 2015 integration into the baseline aircraft is on schedule.

That's good news.

Graff

F-35: GAO reports on software development

Software is the key to many of the advanced capabilities that the F-35 brings to the force.  A careful read of the GAO's report puts blame for its delays on both DoD and the contractor, Lockheed Martin:

The F-35 software development effort is one of the largest and most complex in DOD history. It is essential to achieve capabilities such as sensor fusion, weapons and fire control, maintenance diagnostics, and propulsion. Recent management actions to refocus software development activities and to implement improvement initiatives appear to be yielding benefits, but software will continue to be a very challenging and high risk undertaking for this program, especially for mission systems. Over time, software requirements have grown in size and complexity and the contractor has taken more time and effort than expected to write computer code, integrate it on aircraft and subsystems, conduct lab and flight tests to verify it works, and to correct defects found in testing.

The emphasized line is the key to much of the delay.  "Requirements have grown".  Those increased requirements then have to be implemented via coding of software.  And that means size, complexity and integration issues.  New requirements then have to be tested and integrated, defects identified and corrections made.  It is then back to testing and integration.  At some point, someone on the DoD side has to say, "no more" and refuse any new requirements being added.  It appears that's now the case.

The GAO recommended, in 2011, that certain steps be taken to speed up the development of the F-35's software.  These included:

- starting up and operating a second system integration lab, adding substantial testing and development capability;
- prioritizing and focusing resources on the next block of software and decreasing concurrent work on multiple blocks;
- implementing improvement initiatives recommended by an independent software review; and
- evaluating the possible deferral of some capabilities, either to later blocks or moving them outside the current F-35 program to follow on development efforts.

The GAO notes that their recommendations were put into action with positive results.  For instance:

[P]rogram officials reported that the time span to fix defects has decreased from180 days to 55 days, allowing the program to keep better pace even though the number of defects has increased. In addition, the time taken to build and release software to testing has decreased from 187 hours to 30 hours due to new automated processes. Contractor officials currently plan to broaden the assessment’s initiatives to other software development efforts, including logistics and training.

So, bottom line, we should see an improvement in the speed of software development.  And while the GAO calls recent management actions "positive and encouraging", it notes that there are still challenges ahead:

These recent management actions are positive and encouraging, but overall, software development activities in 2012 lagged behind plans. Most software code has been developed, but a substantial amount of integration and test work remains before the program can demonstrate full warfighting capability. Software capabilities are developed, tested and delivered in three major blocks and two increments—initial and final— within each block

 The status of the three blocks, as reported by the GAO report, is as follows:

- Block 1.0, providing initial training capability, was largely completed in 2012, although some final development and testing will continue. Also, the capability delivered did not fully meet expected requirements relating to the helmet, ALIS, and instrument landing capabilities.
- Block 2.0, providing initial warfighting capabilities and limited weapons, fell behind due to integration challenges and the reallocation of resources to fix block 1.0 defects. The initial increment, block 2A, delivered late and was incomplete. Full release of the final increment, block 2B, has been delayed until November 2013 and won’t be complete until late 2015. The Marine Corps is requiring an operational flight clearance from the Naval Air Systems Command before it can declare an initial operational capability (IOC) for its F- 35B force. IOC is the target date each service establishes for fielding an initial combat capable force.
- Block 3.0 providing full warfighting capability, to include sensor fusion and additional weapons, is the capability required by the Navy and Air Force for declaring their respective IOC dates. Thus far, the program has made little progress on block 3.0 software. The program intends initial block 3.0 to enter flight test in 2013, which will be conducted concurrently with the final 15 months of block 2B flight tests. Delivery of final block 3.0 capability is intended to begin nearly 3 years of developmental flight tests in 2014. This is rated as one of the program’s highest risks because of its complexity.

To review, Block 1.0 still has some tweeks to be made to fully meet expected requirements concerning the helmet, ALIS and IFR requirements, but is otherwise done.

Block 2.0 is scheduled to be delivered in full in late 2015 (it provides the "initial warfighting capabilites".

Block 3.0, the full up warfighting capabilities including sensor fusion, etc, is still in development and the GAO, at least, is reporting "little progress" at this point.  However, the delivery date of 2018 remains the target. 

So, as mentioned, much works remains ahead in the area of software, and delays in its development have and are having an effect on the testing schedules of the program.  GAO concludes:

In particular, the development and testing of software-intensive mission systems are lagging, with the most challenging work ahead. About 12 percent of mission systems capabilities are validated at this time, up from 4 percent about 1 year ago. Progress on mission systems was limited by contractor delays in software delivery, limited capability in the software when delivered, and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software versions. Further development and integration of the most complex elements—sensor fusion and helmet mounted display—lie ahead. Sensor fusion integrates data from critical subsystems and displays the information to the pilot. Figure 2 depicts the percentage of sensor fusion work associated with each software block [ed. - the figure shows 36% with Block 1.0, 22% with Block 2A, 25% with Block 2B and 17% with Block 3). About 36 percent of the sensor fusion work was completed in software block 1. Final verification and closure of remaining fusion requirements through block 3 will not be completed until 2016.

Blocks 2A and 2B is where the majority of the integration will take place, and that's in  development and testing now.  Delivery date remains "late 2015".  As the GAO notes, the "most challenging work" on software lies ahead.  Program management changes have helped speed up development, testing and error correction, but it remains an extraordinarily complex and ambitious undertaking.

I think it is fair to conclude that this is where the action is in the next few years and it is here where the program stands its biggest chance of seeing more delays.  Building on the improvements that have been implemented, freezing any new requirements and adding what resources are necessary to maintain the current projected schedule are ways DoD and the contractor can avoid costly delays. 

The software is the heart and soul of the F-35's capabilities suite.  The hardware is mostly an engineering challenge.  We'll cover one of those challenges tomorrow as we talk about the F-35's helmet.

Graff

F-35: GAO report - reviewing 2012

It is important to understand what was and wasn't accomplished in the F-35 program in 2012 and why.

For the most part, 2012 was a very good year for the program and is considered to have helped get the program back on target and on track.  The GAO offers the following specifics:

The F-35 development flight test program also substantially met 2012 expectations with some revisions to original plans. The program exceeded its planned number of flights by 18 percent, although it fell short of its plan in terms of test points flown by about 3 percent, suggesting that the flights flown were not as productive as expected.7 Test officials had to make several adjustments to plans during the year due to aircraft operating and performance limitations and late releases of software to test. As a result, none of the three variants completed all the 2012 baseline points as originally planned. However, the test team was able to add and complete some test points that had been planned for future years. In this manner, the program was actually able to accomplish more test points in total than planned.

What was it then that caused the slowdown?  Software development for the most part.   Many of the test points that were not accomplished required a certain level of software development and integration.  And that level had not been accomplished in 2012.

Aircraft dedicated to testing mission systems exceeded the number of planned flights and fell just short of accomplishing the total test points planned. Testing supported development of software providing training and initial warfighting capability as well as baseline signature testing. Overall progress in verifying and fielding enhanced capabilities was limited, largely because of late and incomplete software. 

We'll take a look at the GAO's report on the software in more detail tomorrow.

As to each variant, the GAO reported:

The Navy’s F-35C carrier-suitable variant exceeded its number of planned flights and planned test points for 2012. Testing verified the basic flight envelope (demonstrating ranges of speed and altitude), flight with external weapons, and prepared the aircraft for simulated carrier landings. The program also accomplished shore-based tests ofa redesigned arresting hook (the hook engages the landing wires on aircraft carriers).

Shorter version, the C variant is on target and the arresting hook problem appears to have been solved (to be verified at a future date with actual carrier landings).

The STVOL (B) version:

The Marine Corp’s F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing variant exceeded the number of flights and test points. It successfully completed the first weapons release, engine air start tests, fuel dump operations, expanded flight envelope with weapons loaded, and radar signature testing. It also tested re-designed air inlet doors in vertical lift operations.

So the former probationary variant had a very good year and obviously earned it's way off probation early.

The Air Force or "A" variant:

The Air Force’s F-35A conventional takeoff and landing variant accomplished high angle of attack testing, initial weapons separation, and engine air start. It also evaluated flying qualities with internal and external weapons, and expanded the envelope for airspeed and altitude. This variant did not accomplish as many flights as planned and fell short of planned test points by about 15 percent. Operating restrictions and deficiencies in the air refueling system were the main constraints.

The "A" is the test bed furthest along in the testing regimen so it stands to reason that software development would likely retard its testing more than that of the other variants.   And, as mentioned by the GAO, there are some deficiencies in the air refueling system that need to be resolved.  The "A" is where the testing shortfall for the year is found.

But it is pretty obvious that overall, the testing went well for the year and did indeed help the program get back on track.  However, it is just as obvious that software development is one of the keys to maintaining the momentum gained in 2012.  The B and C variants will soon hit that window of time where software could retard their testing.

We'll take a look at the GAO's take on that software tomorrow.

F-35: Singapore will order F-35

Before we get into the GAO report this week, I wanted to note another sign that the F-35 is considered the strike fighter of the future.  The island nation of Singapore has signaled that it intends to order F-35s to replace its aging F-5s and eventually, its F-16s.  Like Israel, Singapore is unlikely to consider a aircraft that it doesn't think will do the job for it when the chips are down.

Singapore's defence minister, Ng Eng Hen, said on Tuesday the air force "has identified the F-35 as a suitable aircraft to further modernise our fighter fleet".

"Our F-5s are nearing the end of their operational life and our F-16s are at their mid-way mark," he said in parliament.

"We are now in the final stages of evaluating the F-35." Ng gave no timeline but said the defence ministry "will have to be satisfied that this state-of-the-art multi-role fighter meets our long-term needs, is on track to be operationally capable and, most importantly, is a cost-effective platform." 

If you've been taken in by all of the critical press that continually claims the F-35 is the plane that won't fly, you have to be asking yourself why countries like Israel and Singapore would be ordering these aircraft if what the critics would have you believe is true?

The obvious answer you'd come up with is they wouldn't.  But they are.  You can draw your own conclusions from that very fact.

Graff

F-35: GAO report

I'll be spending some time on this over the next week, but I thought I'd quickly highlight a pretty good summary to establish a baseline:

The F-35 program made progress in 2012 on several fronts. The program met or substantially met most of its key management objectives established for the year. Also, development flight testing exceeded the planned number of flights by a good margin for 2012, but did not quite accomplish the planned number of test points.  The program made considerable progress in addressing significant technical risks needing resolution, such as the helmet mounted display. Furthermore, software management practices improved, but this area continued to require more time and effort than planned. While the F-35 program made progress in 2012, the bulk of development testing and evaluation is ahead, is planned to continue into 2016, and is expected to identify additional deficiencies impacting aircraft design and performance. To date, slightly more than 11 percent of development contract performance specifications have been verified as met and the development flight test program has cumulatively accomplished just over one-third of the test points and test flights planned. The operational test community raised concerns about the F-35 readiness for training, development test plans and results, and the schedule and resources for starting initial operational testing in 2017. 

Probably the best and most objective summary of the good, the bad and the ugly you're going to see.  None of the hysteria you're used too in the critical press.  None of the odd implications, claims or wild assumptions to wade through.   Progress on all fronts, however, much more work (and testing) is left to be done. 

Note too that the summary makes a point about the progress on the helmet.  It calls the progress "significant".  Improvement in software development management too gets a nod with the added point that it is an area that is still behind schedule and a lot of work remains.  The report notes that production and costs "are trending towards targets and aircraft deliveries are accelerating."

What it doesn't do is try to paint the program as a train wreck as is so typical of the critical media.  It appears to give a good, objective look at the program, notes its deficiencies and challenges while also touting its progress and improvements.

We'll discuss both sides of that as the GAO has covered it in the coming week.  

Graff

F-35: Quotes of the Day

I've pointed out the absurdity of a particular quote attributed to a  "leaked memo" from the Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation Directorate to the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, i.e.:

Other sections of the report outline some of the flaws that make the cockpit unsafe for pilots:

“The out-of-cockpit visibility in the F-35A is less than other Air Force fighter aircraft The head rest is too large and will impede aft [rear] visibility and survivability during surface and air engagements. Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned [down] every time in dogfights."

 Lieutenant General Bogden, DoD's lead man on the F-35 program, was apparently hit with a question about this by someone in the media.  His answer is priceless:

He pointed out the DAS system, would allow rear viewing (and below) and then said, “If some F-35 pilot out there is afraid of getting gunned every time, then we can have him fly C-12s.” 

Of course a C-12 is the military version of a civilian King Air.  In terms of insulting a fighter pilot, I can't imagine a worse one.  What Bogden effectively did is dismiss the criticism as just plain nonsense.   That won't stop uniformed critics from still trying to use this as some sort of indicator of the aircraft's deficiencies, but, in fact, it is a red herring.

The other quote comes from the GAO in a report they released yesterday on the F-35 program.  I'll be going through the report and featuring some of it in the coming week.  However, in answer to those who continue to claim that the F-35 program is still deficient, GAO mostly disagrees:

GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD's restructuring of the F-35 program and other actions are responsive to many prior recommendations. DOD agreed with GAO's report findings and conclusions.

Those first two sentences do more to throw cold water on the critics arguments concerning the program as a whole than anything I've seen in a while.   Is there a lot of work still ahead?  You bet.  Are there challenges still to be overcome.  Yes.  But as the GAO says, the actions and restructuring to date have put the F-35 program on "on firmer footing."

Graff

F-35: A reminder - this isn't your grandpa's fighter jet

With all the nonsense flying around among critics about headrests and reduced visibility from the F-35's canopy, I thought we'd go back to basics today.  Here's a short reminder of the aircraft we're talking about, not the straw one the critics like to attack:

The F-35 joint strike fighter is often defined by its stealth characteristics, and the debate revolves around whether one needs “a high-end aircraft” or, if one is pessimistic, whether “stealth is really stealthy.” Although interesting, such discussions miss the point. Stealth is an enabler for this aircraft, not its central definition. As a Marine F-18 pilot put it:

 "I would say low observability is a capability set or is an asset to the platform, but the platform as a whole brings a lot by itself. There are situations where low observability will be very important to the mission set that you’re operating in. And then there will be situations where the ISR package or the imaging package that comes with that aircraft, the ability to see things, will be more important; that will change based on the mission set and how you define the mission."

Moreover, one of the challenges facing the F-35 is that it is often described using historical aviation words, generally obscuring the technological advance of stealth itself. As Lieutenant General David Deptula, USAF (Ret.), constantly reminded his Service and others, the “F” before the F-22 and the F-35 is somewhat of a misnomer. There are significant generational changes in the way individual combat aircraft and fleets of aircraft handle data and can make decisions.7

Stealth on this aircraft is a function of the manufacturing process; it is not hand built into the aircraft and maintained as such. It is a characteristic of high-tolerance manufacturing, and as such, stealth will be maintained in the field, not in the factory or depot. This is revolutionary in character.

 At the heart of the F-35 is a new comprehensive combat systems enterprise.8 The F-35 is the first combat aircraft that sees completely around itself. The Electro Optical Distributed Aperture System (DAS) makes this happen, and it allows the operator or the fleet managers to see hundreds of miles away on a 360-degree basis. The combat system enterprise allows the aircraft to manage the battlespace within this seamless 360-degree space.

Unlike legacy aircraft, which add systems that have to be managed by the pilot, the F-35 creates a synergy ­workspace where the core combat systems work interactively to create functional outcomes; for example, jamming can be performed by the overall systems, not just by a dedicated electronic warfare system.

The F-35 is a flying combat system integrator and in a different historical epoch than the F-15s, F-18s, and F-16s. The 360-degree capability, coupled with the combat system enterprise, explains these historic differences on a per plane basis. 

The ability of the new aircraft to shape distributed air operations collectively is another historic change that the United States and its allies need to make, especially with the growing missile, air defense, and offensive air capabilities in the global market space and battlespace. The legacy combat aircraft have added new combat subsystems over a 30-year period. These evolved aircraft and their new subsystems are additive, iterative, and sequential. The resulting configurations are built over the core foundational aircraft. All of the legacy U.S. aircraft with the latest modifications, when offered for foreign sale, were rejected in India’s fighter competition for the much newer European fighters, the Eurofighter and Rafale.

The F-35 was built with a foundation that allows interactivity across the combat systems, permitting the forging of a combat system enterprise managed by the computer on the aircraft. Said another way, F-35 core combat systems are interactive with one another, creating a synergistic outcome and capability rather than providing an additive-segmented tool. 

The aircraft’s systems are built on a physical link, namely, a high-speed data bus built on high-speed fiber optical systems. To provide a rough comparison, legacy aircraft are communicating over a dial-up modem compared to the F-35 system, which is equivalent to a high-speed broadband system. The new data bus and high-speed broadband are the facilitators of this fully integrated data-sharing environment on the aircraft. While legacy aircraft have had similar subsystems, integration was far less mature. 

The emphasis is all mine and is there to point to the areas and capabilities that critics just can't seem to wrap their heads around.  This aircraft isn't about "dogfights" - that's 4th generation thinking (although all indications are, given it's systems and low observability, the F-35 would acquit itself well in that sort of an environment).  It is about a revolutionary step in a new direction with one-of-a-kind capabilities that will change how combat aircraft are deployed and used.

I don't understand why this new conceptual framework (along with F-35's new advanced capability) is so difficult for critics of the program to understand.

Graff

F-35: The art of fighting strawmen

Some of the critics are simply desperate when it comes to denigrating the F-35.  And one of the things they love to do is pretend the aircraft is something it isn't and then tear it apart because it isn't.

The perfect example is characterizing the F-35 as a air superiority fighter.  It is a constant attempt on the part of many critics.  I pointed to one just the other day.

The name of the F-35 is "Joint STRIKE fighter".  It isn't nor has it ever been touted as an air superiority fighter.   That's the F-22 Raptor's job.  That doesn't mean that the F-35 isn't capable of shooting down enemy aircraft, however, the idea (think low observable) is to get the F-35 into areas without being seen and striking targets such as air defenses and other selected targets in support of the commander's objectives.  And to do that, you're likely going to try to avoid other aircraft.

But what if you can't?  Well here are the critic's latest "criticisms":

Other sections of the report outline some of the flaws that make the cockpit unsafe for pilots: “The out-of-cockpit visibility in the F-35A is less than other Air Force fighter aircraft The head rest is too large and will impede aft [rear] visibility and survivability during surface and air engagements. Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned [down] every time in dogfights."

That's supposedly from a "leaked memo" from the Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation Directorate to the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I say "supposedly" because it seems to be completely ignorant of the 360 visibility capability for the aircraft. What it essentially implies is the ability of the pilot to see 360 degrees with the F-35's helmet and sensors doesn't exist or won't exist.

As we've pointed out many times the advanced helmet for the F-35 does indeed exist as does the capability for 360 degree visibility.  Out of cockpit visibility is, well, 360 degrees.  And the "headrest" will not get in the way since the pilot will actually be looking behind him with the sensor mounted outside and behind the cockpit and not trying to see through the headrest.

Certainly, as we've noted, the helmet has had some challenges.  It had latency and jitter problems, but those have apparently been solved.  And the night vision acuity problem is being worked on.  But the fact remains that the 360 degree visibility is available and working ... a feature no other fighter jet enjoys.

But you wouldn't know it from the critics who, apparently, are either ignorant of its existence or simply prefer pretending it doesn't exist.

Graff

F-35: LTG Bogden corrects the record

Apparently there's a learning curve even for Lieutenant Generals when dealing with the press on a high visibility program:

U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Christopher Bogdan told a defense conference that he'd reached his quota for "juicy, controversial, headline-making quotes" for the month after lashing the plane's manufacturer Lockheed Martin Corp and enginemaker Pratt & Whitney during an air show in Australia. 

Of course, what everyone should know is that "costs" on any program, in the wake of the unilateral defense spending cuts made by the Obama administration followed by the impact of sequestration are going to have all DoD program chiefs hollering about keeping them down.   Anyone with business experience recognizes such actions as a form of negotiation.  But, of course, that's now how his words were interpreted by the press.

Bogdan told a conference hosted by Aviation Week on Tuesday that his comments were taken "a little out of context" and he had never said the $396 billion fighter program - the Pentagon's largest weapons program - was in trouble. "I will overcommunicate all the troubles we have on this program as long as you don't overreact," he said. 

I got a chuckle out of that last comment.  Of course the press did overreact, thus the reason for the comment and the necessity to set the record straight.  Costs, as we've chronicled here, are coming down.  However, as we've mentioned, the laws of economics still apply.  Cut the program, cut the production total, etc. and that will drive the price, per copy up.

Back to Bogden - he admits that costs are coming down:

On Tuesday, Bogdan cited progress on the quality of software work being done by Lockheed, and said production costs were the "shining star" of the program since they were now coming down. 

He also pointed to a few of the issues the critics love to bash and pretty frankly said, "no big deal":

He said technical issues such as the plane's complex helmet and the tailhook on the Navy's version of the plane, did not keep him up at night since the program was still in development. "The fact of the matter is we are still in development. We only have a third of our flight test program completed. You've got to expect that we're going to find things," he said. Bogdan said defects and issues could still arise during the rest of flight testing, which meant that the jet could be grounded again at some point. "I hope not, but it's not unexpected," he said. 

Of course they're not unexpected to anyone who has followed any military weapons system through it's development.  It is only the critics who have no such experience, or apparently never learned from what experience they might have (or find it more convenient to ignore that experience) where you'll see every developmental issue characterized as a fatal flaw.

Graff
 

F-35: Beware of critics without a clue

Unfortunately when talking about the F-35, the discussion has become very polarized.  And just as unfortunately, those who are critics of the program tend to do a lot of talking about a subject they seem to know little about or are prone to misrepresent it or both.

And example of that is here.  This particular person just can't seem to wrap his head around the fact that the F-35 is not an F-22 and was never designed to be an F-22.   Additionally he quotes Winslow Wheeler, which in itself, damages any credibility he might have.  He also misrepresents the low observability of the F-35. He uses dated and incorrect data. And, finally, it appears that the author has absolutely no concept of what the F-35's capabilities actually are or how they are used.

In other words, the usual mind-numbingly irrelevant stuff from a would-be critic.

As a review of what the F-35 is all about, I again direct your attention to the work of Robbin F. Laird and Edward T. Timperlake and their paper "The F-35 and the Future of Power Projection."

It would be nice, for once, to see a critic take on the real F-35 and talk about it's capabilities and it's purpose instead of, as usual, tearing into a straw F-35 they invent out of their ignorance.

I'll leave you with this little reminder:

An excellent insight into the role of the F-22 in anticipating the F-35 was provided by a Marine Corps F-22 pilot. ­Lieutenant Colonel Dave Berke is becoming a key F-35 squadron commander, but he provided an interview while at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) regarding his experience with the F-22 and how he saw the plane as part of the ongoing revolution in re-norming air operations. In response to a question about what the fused sensor experience is all about in fifth-generation aircraft and how the whole capability of an aircraft is not really an F series but a flying combat system, Berke provided the following explanation:

"I think you’re hitting the nail on the head with what the JSF is going to do, but it’s also what the Raptor missions have already morphed into. The concept of Raptor employment covers two basic concepts. You’ve got an antiaccess/global strike mission; and you have the integration mission as well. And the bottom line is that the integration mission is our bread and butter. When I say “us,” I’m talking about the Air Force and the F-22. Most of our expected operating environments are going to be integrated."

As a pilot with significant operational experience across the legacy fleet, Berke provided insight into how the fifth-generation solution was different:

"It’s a major evolution. There’s no question about it. My career has been in F-18s, but I also flew F-16s for 3 years. I was dual operational in the Hornet and the Viper when I was a TOPGUN instructor. I am now coming up on 3 years flying Raptors. I was also on carriers for 4 years, so I’ve done a lot of integration with the Navy and a lot of integration with the Air Force. Three years flying with the Air Force has been pretty broadening. 
 
For me, it’s a great experience to see the similarities and difference between the Services. Navy and Marine aviation is very similar. USAF aviation is very different in some ways. I actually was with the Army for a year as FAC [forward air controller] in Iraq as well. So from a tactical level, I’ve got a lot of tactical operator experience with all three Services—Navy, Army, and the Air Force. This has been really illuminating for me having the experience with all of the Services in tactical operations. 

Obviously I will draw upon that experience when I fully engage with the JSF. But flying a Raptor, the left, right, up, down, is just flying; flying is flying. So getting in an airplane and flying around really is not that cosmic no matter what type of airplane you’re sitting in. 

But the difference between a Hornet or a Viper and the Raptor isn’t just the way you turn or which way you move the jet or what is the best way to attack a particular problem. The difference is how you think. You work totally differently to garner situational awareness [SA] and make decisions; it’s all different in the F-22. With the F-22 and certainly it will be the case with the F-35, you’re operating at a level where you perform several functions of classic air battle management and that’s a whole different experience and a different kind of training. . . ."

So who are you going to believe - a pilot with "significant operational experience" or some know-nothing critic without a clue?

Graff

F-35: LRIP 8 funded

 Just hours before sequestration took effect, LRIP 8 was funded by DoD:

Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT) received a $333.7 million U.S. downpayment to buy initial parts, components and materials for an eighth batch of F-35 jets, as the Pentagon locked in the funds hours before automatic budget cuts begin.

Yesterday’s action exempts the funds from the across-the- board spending reductions known as sequestration that take effect today because Pentagon officials have said contracts with obligated dollars won’t be cut or terminated. The eighth contract calls for 35 jets, including four aircraft for the U.K. and two for Norway, according to a Pentagon statement.

This will mean two things - continuity in production and lower costs.  And despite all DoD's carping about this and that, they realize the absolute necessity of this program to the future needs of our military and our country.

And hopefully, by the time production run is due, this will all be sorted out.

Graff

F-35: Fleet cleared for take off again

As expected, the F-35 program is back in the air. 

F-35s were grounded after a crack was found during a routine inspection of a turbine blade of a test aircraft stationed at Edward Air Force Base. The engine was taken to manufacturer Pratt and Whitney's Middletown, Conn. Facility for testing.

Company officials said the results showed the particular F-35 had been operated "for an extended time in the high-temperature environment in its mission to expand the F-35 flight envelope.

Prolonged exposure to high levels of heat and other operational stressors on this specific engine were determined to be the cause of the crack." Pratt and Whitney said no additional cracks were found during the inspections of the remaining F-35 inventory. 

The crack in one blade was on one of the original test aircraft that has been subjected to a great deal of stressful testing.  When you do that, parts will eventually break or fail.  In this case, while the blade did indeed crack, it didn't fail.  It was instead found during routine maintenance checks, just like it is supposed to happen.

The fact that the rest of the fleet has been cleared to resume flying points to the fact that it isn't considered to be a defect with the engine.

Or, for some of those wringing their hands out there and trying to portray this as "another failure in a troubled program", pretty much normal wear and tear that all fighter aircraft at some point experience.

Graff

F-35: Japan restates its committment to the F-35

What is it that Japan and Israel understand about the capabilities of the F-35 that critics just don't seem to be able to wrap their heads around?  Apparently quite a bit.  Recently, Japan's Defense Minister reiterated Japan's commitment to the F-35:

Japan is confident Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT)’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will overcome its development setbacks and expects to accept an initial order of four planes on schedule in 2016, Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera said.

“Problems tend to occur when a plane is in development,” Onodera said today in an interview at his office in Tokyo. “We have heard nothing from the U.S. to say there will be a delay. We think the end result will be a good product.” 

Apparently, with China on its doorstep and North Korea lurking offshore, they find it hard to believe that all future wars will be "asymetric".  

They also seem to be able to understand how modern fighter aircraft are developed and have confidence in the outcome of the program.

And they also realize that their current 4th generation fleet is woefully inadequate to their future defense needs.  Remember, Japan was not an original allied nation (nor was Israel) involved in the development of the Joint Strike Fighter.  They're a nation that made the decision to buy outside that partnership.

One would certainly have to ask, given the level of criticism in some quarters, why both Japan and Israel - neither nation is known to buy poor defense products - have ignored the criticism and opted for the F-35?

The answer, it would seem, is obvious.

Graff

F-35: A comprehensive comparative look at the F-35

I found this while perusing the web and was impressed by the thoroughness and completeness of the analysis. The author addresses a multitude of topics in his review.  This is written addressing Canadian concerns about the F-35, but they are concerns you see thrown around all the time by others concerning the F-35.    A snippet of the purpose of his article:

The source of many of these assertions of poor performance from the F-35 can generally be traced back to Dr. Dr Carlo Kopp of Air power Australia. Kopp claims that the F-35 is inferior to almost all modern 4.5 generation fighters. He vehemently disapproves of his country's decision to purchase the F-35 and pushes the Australian government to keep requesting the American F-22A. In his reports he says that the F-35 isn't stealthy enough to penetrate Chinese airspace, not maneuverable enough to win a dogfight, and doesn't carry enough ordinance to make it an effective air superiority fighter. Too be honest, Dr. Carlo Kopp is too biased. 

From there, the author skillfully and completely disassemble's Kopp's arguments.

Definitely recommended reading.

Graff